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Abstract In this paper, we analyze the relative importance
and mutual behavior of two competing base-load electricity
generation options that each are capable of contributing
significantly to the abatement of global CO2 emissions:
nuclear energy and coal-based power production comple-
mented with CO2 capture and storage (CCS). We also
investigate how, in scenarios developed with an integrated
assessment model that simulates the economics of a climate-
constrained world, the prospects for nuclear energy would
change if exogenous limitations on the spread of nuclear
technology were relaxed. Using the climate change econom-
ics model World Induced Technical Change Hybrid, we find
that until 2050 the growth rates of nuclear electricity
generation capacity would become comparable to historical
rates observed during the 1980s. Given that nuclear energy
continues to face serious challenges and contention, we
inspect how extensive the improvements of coal-based
power equipped with CCS technology would need to be if
our economic optimization model is to significantly scale
down the construction of new nuclear power plants.
Keywords Economic competition . Electricity sector .
Nuclear power . Coal power . CCS . Renewables . Climate
policy
JEL Classification D8 . D9 . H0 . O3 . O4 . Q4 . Q5
1 Introduction
The development of nuclear power has experienced signifi-
cant hindrance from concerns over three main categories of
issues that are intrinsically related to its use: reactor accidents,
radioactive waste, and nuclear proliferation. Arguments
regarding economic competition and public opinion and more
recently terrorist activity add to the obstacles faced by the civil
use of nuclear energy for electricity generation. These
fundamental drawbacks of nuclear energy have been the
principal cause for this power production option not to have
expanded as widely as predicted decades ago by many energy
specialists, while when launched in the 1960s it was portrayed
as a promising energy alternative and foreseen by some to
potentially fulfill much of mankind’s future energy needs.
Nonetheless, in recent years, the debate over the role of
nuclear power has revived, particularly as a result of high
current fuel prices and likely future threats emanating from
global climate change. Even after the recent financial crisis,
we are likely to see an increase in the construction of nuclear
power plants worldwide over the years to come. Before the
start of this crisis in the fall of 2008, particularly countries in
Asia (among which China, India, Japan, and South Korea)
were reported to have large nuclear capacity expansion plans
for the short to medium term [9]. Today countries with
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ambitious and increasingly concrete nuclear energy plans
can also and especially be found in the Middle East.
During the past decade, climate change has gained broad
public attention; today it appears high on most countries’
political agendas. Policymakers, notably those involved in
negotiating a post-2012 climate agreement, rely increasing-
ly on quantitative estimates of the implications of climate
change. Similarly, they are informed more and more
quantitatively about the possible implications of climate
policy for national, regional, and global technology
diffusion and economic development. The economic anal-
ysis of climate policy has therefore become a fertile and
rapidly growing research area. It forms the basis of the
surveys carried out by Working Group III of the Intergov-
ernmental Panel on Climate Change (IPCC). In this branch
of research, energy–environment–economy (EEE) models
occupy a leading role, since they are capable of generating
figures on the technological, climatic, and economic
variables at stake. Determining the values of these variables
and their mutual interferences requires the large-scale
integrated assessment approach offered by EEE models.
Different modeling techniques can be employed to prevent
a restricted number of technologies from either dominating
the entire climate mitigation portfolio or hardly contributing to
it at all. Some of these involve means of slightly changing
various types of input assumptions, a practice known
colloquially as “penny switching.” They can also involve
the introduction of limitations on technology penetration rates
or the use of supply cost curves. Indeed, such constraints are
frequently an essential element of EEE models. Given the
distinctive nature of nuclear power, however, the use of such
restrictive assumptions to capture the potential consequences
of its drawbacks warrants particular attention. The uncertain-
ties governing quantitative estimates of the economic and
social costs associated, for instance, with waste management
and nuclear proliferation are such that ex-ante hypotheses
regarding the deployment potential of nuclear power are often
based on the modelers’ perception of the technology’s
attractiveness rather than on un-ambivalent objective analysis.
The approach of straight-jacketing technology diffusion
through the application of deployment constraints can be
questioned for at least four reasons.
First, adding constraints to optimization models results in
economic penalties that depend on the extent to which the
space of feasible solutions is reduced. The tendency of nuclear
power to dominate over alternative technologies, even when
carbon dioxide is priced at relatively low levels, suggests that
ad hoc restrictions on this specific technology might have a
significant bearing on the economic costs of climate protec-
tion. Second, imposing growth constraints on particular
technologies in order to avoid an outcome that one judges
unlikely or unacceptable may be considered at odds with the
underlying methodology of economic optimization. Third,
however, reasonable it may be to remain reserved about the
prospects of a given technology, as with nuclear energy in our
case, the imposition of an external constraint on the speed
with which this technology can be deployed in the future may
be inconsistent with historical records. This practice therefore
often renders the calculated scenarios rather subjective.
Fourth, while the approaches of cost minimization, profit
maximization, or welfare optimization all have solid founda-
tions in economic theory and comply with standard empiri-
cally observed phenomena, there is often little economic
rationale for the existence of a central agent or socially
optimizing institution, especially at the global level, that in our
case would be in the position to impose a universal restriction
(or stimulus) on the expansion of a certain energy technology.
At best, one could argue that through international agree-
ments, social processes, and public organizations, the nature
of deployable technologies could be requested to satisfy
certain minimum (preferably enforceable) quality, safety,
environmental, or usability qualifications.
The potential contribution of nuclear power to the
mitigation effort required for global climate stabilization
varies appreciably across different studies and depends among
others on the type of climate policy architecture implemented
in the near future (see, e.g., Weisser et al. [20]). In some cases,
nuclear power is expected to play a negligible role in carbon
mitigation scenarios. For example, in a recent modeling
comparison exercise that includes simulations by the MIT
Integrated Global System Model, stabilization scenarios are
reported with a use of nuclear energy not much different
from the no-climate-policy case and limited at roughly
today’s values [5]. The ex-ante opinion of the authors is that,
mostly for security and safety reasons, nuclear power ought
to be constrained in the portfolio of CO2 abatement options.
Their assumption may be legitimate—indeed, for these
reasons, nuclear power has not been eligible for emissions
avoidance under all mechanisms created in the context of the
Kyoto Protocol. We argue, however, that the audience
reading and interpreting scenario modeling results should
be informed about the economic and technological con-
sequences that stem from such an assumption.1
Unfortunately, reports on climate economics modeling often
lack transparency in this respect. In comprehensive studies such
as produced by Working Group III of the IPCC, e.g., in its
Fourth Assessment Report, nuclear power is found to play
some mitigation role, but significantly less than other technol-
ogies like CO2 capture and storage (CCS) or renewables (see
Fig. SPM 9 in [10]). Little insight is provided in how this
result relates to a series of relevant modeling assumptions
including with regards to the nuclear penetration rate.
1 More recently, some modeling assumptions fed into the MIT
scenarios were revised: Nuclear power is now projected to increase
more rapidly than in previous studies (see [13]).
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This article is meant to shed light on this issue. We use
the World Induced Technical Change Hybrid (WITCH)
model to investigate how in a climate-constrained world the
prospects for nuclear energy would change if imposed
restrictions on technological growth are relaxed (for details
on the WITCH model, see, e.g., Bosetti et al. [1]). Given
that nuclear energy continues to remain unpopular in
several countries, largely for reasons related to its inalien-
able risks, we also evaluate the improvements of its main
base-load electricity production competitor—coal-fired
power plants complemented with CCS technology—needed
to significantly scale down the prospects for nuclear power
on purely (non-constrained) economic grounds. Bosetti et
al. [2] evaluate with WITCH the optimal portfolio of
investments in energy technology deployment and energy
R&D, from an economic viewpoint, for a range of climate
stabilization scenarios. This paper extends their work by
explicitly focusing on the role of nuclear electricity vis-à-
vis other non-carbon power generation technologies.
Despite a rapidly growing body of literature that inves-
tigates a broad scope of climate mitigation options, little
energy system or general equilibrium analysis has concen-
trated on the specific role of nuclear power in global climate
stabilization scenarios. Chakravorty et al. [4] provide a partial
equilibrium analysis that accounts for the exhaustibility of
uranium ore reserves. A refined back-of-the-envelope calcu-
lation of the possible contribution of nuclear energy to
mitigating global climate change can be found in van der
Zwaan [18]. Rogner et al. [14] calculate country-dependent
levelized life-cycle electricity costs for nuclear energy.
Vaillancourt et al. [17] use the detailed energy systems model
TIMES to explore a range of nuclear deployment scenarios,
under various sets of assumptions on technology parameters
and exogenous constraints for nuclear power development to
reflect, for instance, social perceptions. The analysis presented
in this paper is a contribution to this under-explored subject
matter. In attempting to address the aforementioned modeling
issues and overcome some of the associated caveats, we use
historical references to benchmark nuclear deployment in a
carbon-constrained world, with a minimum reliance on ex-
ante hypotheses. We also provide a detailed comparison of
nuclear energy with its main competitive base-load low-
carbon power generation alternative.
In Section 2 of this article, we describe the main features
of the climate change integrated assessment model WITCH
that we use for our analysis. Section 3 presents our scenario
results, based on tests with regard to the slackening of
diffusion limitations for new nuclear electricity generation
capacity. Section 4 reports the techno-economic advance-
ments for CCS technology needed to downsize the
deployment of nuclear energy on competitive grounds.
Section 5 presents a discussion of our findings and draws
our main conclusions.
2 The WITCH Model
The WITCH model, developed by the climate change team
at FEEM, has been extensively used for the investigation of
climate-related research subjects.2 It belongs to the collec-
tion of integrated assessment models dedicated to enhanc-
ing our understanding of the economic implications of
climate change mitigation policies. These models allow for
determining economically efficient strategies to achieve a
broad range of possible climate control targets. With respect
to other models of a similar kind—now widely used for the
numerical analysis of energy–climate–economy interac-
tions, notably as part of ongoing work for the IPCC—
WITCH has a series of features that place it in a position to
capture additional aspects of the climate change conun-
drum.
WITCH has a neo-classical optimal growth structure.
The long-term nature of climate change is accounted for via
inter-temporal optimization of far-sighted economic agents
who can incorporate future effects into current decision
making. Strategies calculated by the solution of model runs
are thus efficient over long periods of time, an important
characteristic given that CO2 has an atmospheric lifetime of
hundreds of years and investments in the energy sector
usually generate lock-ins that last for decades.3 As a result,
today’s decisions lead to long-lasting responses and are
important determinants of how the future looks like, the
climatic and economic dynamics of which are modeled
in WITCH. The simulation of the energy sector, the
largest source of greenhouse gas emissions, is fully
integrated in the aggregate production function, a “hard
link” that ensures consistency of economic output with
investments in conventional or innovative energy car-
riers and electricity production facilities. The power
sector consists of seven options capable of generating
electricity: These are based on, respectively, traditional
coal (i.e., pulverized coal, PC, without CCS), advanced
coal (an integrated gasification combined cycle (IGCC)
with CCS), oil, natural gas, hydropower, nuclear energy,
and renewables (in our case a combination of wind and
solar energy).
WITCH possesses a game-theoretical setup that allows
mimicking free-riding incentives that the 12 regions
constituting the world are confronted with as a result of
the consumption of public “goods” and production of
public “bads.” Global externalities due to emissions of CO2
(reflected by a damage function and a global atmosphere–
climate module), extraction limits of exhaustible resources
2 For more details, see, e.g., Bosetti et al. [1] and the model’s website
at http://www.witchmodel.org.
3 The half time of atmospheric CO2 is roughly 100 years, and the
lifetime of a power plant can surpass half a century.
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such as fossil fuels, and a limited appropriability of
knowledge behind innovation are also taken into account,
so that regions choose their investment paths strategically
with respect to the choices of other regions. The result is a
hybrid model that provides quantitative insight in the
design of climate protection policies and informs policy-
makers regarding the economically efficient set of strategies
fit to address global climate change, while it simultaneously
deals with a set of inter-related environmental and
economic (in)efficiencies.
Given that the focus of this paper is on the power sector
(and given our assumption that hydropower is little
expandable on a global basis), the three most prominent
essentially carbon-free technologies are coal-based power
plants equipped with CCS, nuclear power plants, and
electricity generation based on renewables (that consist of
a bundle of wind and solar energy). Table 1 provides our
main techno-economic assumptions for these technologies.
Nuclear energy and IGCC plants complemented with CCS
technology are described by rather similar parameter values
in some respects: relatively high investment costs and a
high utilization factor as typical for base-load electricity
production. Coal reserves are assumed to be abundant, with
an equilibrium price not exceeding $80/t throughout the
century in a business-as-usual (BAU) coal-intensive sce-
nario. Similarly, uranium is assumed to be sufficiently
abundant at low prices to satisfy a significant revival of the
nuclear industry during the twenty-first century [3]. The
cost of uranium is modeled endogenously via resource
extraction curves. Reserves are assumed to be particularly
large at prices up to a level of approximately $300/kg, at
which point reprocessing spent fuel and the use of fast
breeder reactors become competitive (hence preventing any
further rise in the price of uranium and corresponding cost
increase of nuclear energy). In order to be used as fissile
material, uranium ore must undergo a process of conver-
sion, enrichment, and fuel fabrication; we have set the
corresponding cost at $250/kg (see [12]). Nuclear waste
storage and management fees are assumed to increase
linearly with the quantity of spent fuel produced and are set
at 0.1¢/kWh [12]. For CCS, CO2 transport and storage
costs are accounted for via regional supply curves calibrat-
ed on data available in Hendriks et al. [7]. The fraction of
CO2 captured is supposed to be 90%, and a zero geological
CO2 leakage rate is assumed. Wind and solar energy are
characterized by relatively low investment costs, but also
by a low load or utilization factor. They are the only
technologies that we assume to be subject to significant
technological change through learning-by-doing: Especially
for solar power plants, it is expected that there is substantial
scope for further improvements in competitiveness. We
therefore assume that wind and solar power are subject to
progress in such a way that each doubling of cumulative
installed capacity leads to an investment cost reduction of
13%. This is a rather conservative value in comparison to
learning rates observed in practice because we argue
learning will not continue indefinitely [6, 8].
3 Scenario Results
In addition to a BAU scenario, under median assumptions
on population growth and economic development and
central values for a range of energy technology parameters
and their evolution over time, we model two policy
scenarios, consistent with the stabilization of atmospheric
concentrations of CO2 at 450 and 550 ppm. For all
greenhouse gases combined, we assume that these concen-
trations roughly correspond to 550 and 650 ppm-e (CO2-
equivalent) stabilization scenarios, respectively. These two
scenarios are thus compatible with a stabilization of the
global average atmospheric temperature at an increase of
2.5°C and 3°C, respectively, if the climate sensitivity is
lower than 3°C. Although the IPCC suggests a considerably
more stringent target of 2°C, both scenarios imply very
significant emission reductions. Global emissions are
assumed to peak in 2015 for the 450-ppm case and in
2050 for the 550-ppm case, while cumulative mitigation
throughout the century would amount to over 1,100 and
750 GtCO2, respectively. Because of the convexity of the
marginal abatement cost curve in our model, the additional
effort needed to achieve the most stringent target would
come at a considerably and disproportionally higher price.
The scenarios are run up to 2150, but for our present
purposes, it suffices to report results until 2050 only. The
reference year for our optimization runs is 2005. While
Coal+CCS Nuclear energy Wind+solar
Investment cost ($2,005/kW) 2,500 2,500 1,900
Utilization factor, % 85 85 25
Thermal efficiency, % 40a 35 –
CO2 capture or avoidance share, % 90 100 100
Learning rate, % – – 13
Table 1 Techno-economic
assumptions for the main low-
carbon electricity generation
alternatives in WITCH: coal+
CCS, nuclear energy, and
renewables
a This value accounts for the energy
penalty that results from the CO2
capture process
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under these climate control scenarios the development of all
power generation options are affected, either negatively (as
with the carbon-intensive options) or positively (the carbon-
poor alternatives), with respect to the BAU run, we inspect
for our purposes here three (clusters of) technologies only:
nuclear power, coal with CCS, and renewables (wind and
solar energy combined).
Figure 1 shows the simulation by WITCH of the 5-year
averages of annual capacity additions (excluding the
replacement of ageing existing capacity) for nuclear power
until 2050 under each of the three scenarios. The values of
the annual additions as realized over the past two decades
are also plotted, as well as the historic single-year
maximum attained during this time frame. We see that in
the BAU scenario nuclear power additions over the
forthcoming decades reach a value of over 10 GW/year,
while in recent years this annual new capacity did not
amount to more than a few gigawatts per year at most. This
result connects to the reality in several countries with rapid
economic growth, like (but not exclusively) China and
India, where increased interest exists for this power
production option for reasons of competitive costs, energy
security, and air pollution control. Figure 1 also shows that
under a 550-ppm climate stabilization scenario, this new
capacity deployment is significantly enhanced to a level of
15–20 GW/year and reaches a value of over 35 GW/year by
the middle of the century under a 450-ppm scenario. In the
550-ppm scenario, annual additions of nuclear capacity
reach the level observed in the 1980s, while in the 450-ppm
scenario they obtain after several decades a value consis-
tently similar to the 1-year high of 1985. The explanation
for this rapid expansion of nuclear power is of course the
fact that nuclear energy emits essentially no CO2 and that
the carbon price needed to achieve emission reductions
coherent with the indicated climate targets is substantial and
grows fast. For example, in the stringent 450-ppm scenario,
the marginal cost of CO2 abatement exceeds $100/tCO2
already in 2030 and grows markedly after that. This growth
in the value of CO2 naturally provides a large incentive for
the deployment of CO2-free technologies for power
generation, a sector characterized by marginal abatement
costs less steep than other parts of the economy such as the
transportation sector.
Total installed capacity for nuclear power in 2050
amounts to roughly 1,150 and 1,500 GW for the 550- and
450-ppm cases, respectively. These numbers are somewhat
higher in comparison to estimates reported in, for example,
Vaillancourt et al. [17], who determine a nuclear capacity of
about 1,000 GW in a 450-ppm scenario and slightly lower
numbers for 550 ppm and BAU cases. The International
Energy Agency [9], which analyzes scenarios with some-
what different climate objectives, projects nuclear capacity
in 2050 to lie between 860 and 1,150 GW.
Figure 2 shows the same results for the development of
coal-based electricity generation equipped with and without
CCS technology (note the larger vertical scale). CCS
technology is obviously not economical without a price
on CO2, as demonstrated by the horizontal line for BAU,
but experiences a widespread application under either a
450- or 550-ppm climate stabilization target. Under a 550-
ppm scenario in less than two decades, as much as 30-GW/
year additional coal-based power plants are (fully) equipped
with CCS technology until at least the middle of the century
(and in fact much beyond). Typically this level of annual
additions equals the average number of new coal-based
power plants (without CCS) built since the 1990s. Under a
450-ppm climate target, the use of CCS explodes initially,
reaching a peak around 2020 of over 40 GW/year of
additional capacity. This exceedingly high level (although
still below the record level of non-CCS coal-based power
plants taken in operation in 2005) vanishes over time,
however, given that the low but non-zero CO2 emission rate
of coal plus CCS power (see Table 1) is penalized by
progressively stringent climate obligations (instead of
which totally carbon-free technologies are preferred).4
Nonetheless, for both climate policies, the deployment of
CCS becomes very significant and reaches a level as high
as 550 GtCO2 of cumulative storage by the end of the
century, with a world average transport and storage cost by
then of about $25/tCO2.
As extensively described in the literature, it is unlikely







































Fig. 1 WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of nuclear
power (in gigawatts per year) in BAU, 450 and 550 ppm scenarios, as
well as realized during 1985–2005. The “single-year” point shows the
historic maximum realized
4 A higher CO2 capture rate or the use of CCS in conjunction with
biomass would allow CCS to remain competitive in a stringent climate
scenario beyond 2050.
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address any reasonable level of climate control [10].
Indeed, Fig. 3 confirms that renewables such as wind
energy and solar power are strong favorites as necessary
additional mitigation options (notably in regions with large
wind and solar radiation potentials). Even under BAU
conditions, wind and solar power continue their surge and
easily more than double over the forthcoming decades in
terms of annual power additions from the present value of
about 5 GW/year. When global climate policy is adhered to,
renewables will grow much faster: Their additions may
even exponentially increase to values over 30 GW/year by
2050 in the case of a 450-ppm climate objective. Such
stringent climate policy would rapidly render renewable
energy at a similar footing as the traditional options
currently in use, as a result of its increased competitiveness
following policy-induced learning-by-doing effects. For the
moment, however, renewables are still characterized by a
relatively low deployment rate in absolute terms, due to
their high early investment costs and low capacity factors,
especially for solar energy.
Our overall observation is that each of these three types
of power technologies—nuclear energy, coal plus CCS, and
renewables—is needed for serious climate change control,
in addition to extensive efficiency and savings efforts. In
order to reach CO2 emission reduction targets that avoid
increasing the atmospheric CO2 concentration to more than
450 or 550 ppm, at least two of these three options are
needed at a globally very large scale and most probably all
three (and more). We also see that, when the commonly
applied growth constraints on nuclear power are relaxed, it
is expanded rapidly but with rates not exceeding much the
levels experienced in the past. Indeed, we find that the
nuclear energy growth rates generated by WITCH are
generally consistent with those observed during the 1970s
and 1980s, i.e., when nuclear power was in its heydays and
experienced a more favorable attitude than it did over the
past two decades. Compatible results can be found in
Bosetti et al. [2].
4 Implications and Alternatives
All scenarios depicted in Fig. 1 foresee an expansion of the
total capacity of nuclear energy over the coming half-
century. In the 450-ppm case, for example, the available
nuclear power in 2050 is increased by about a factor of
three with respect to the currently installed global capacity
of 370 GW. What does this imply for nuclear energy? The
simulated growth paths for nuclear energy respond, along
with other non-carbon energy resources, to the challenge of
mitigating global climate change while simultaneously
generating benefits in terms of air pollution reduction and
energy security enhancement. Such an expansion would
also spur innovation in the nuclear industry and generate
incentives to develop and deploy new reactors of, e.g.,
generation III and eventually generation IV types. These
can profit from technological improvements with respect to
reactors presently in operation (see, e.g., [19]).In economic
terms, an expansion of the nuclear sector could produce
economies of scale, with corresponding cost reductions.
Troublesome, however, is that an expansion of nuclear power
would exacerbate the already serious concerns regarding its
use at current levels, that is, in terms of the “classical”
intricacies associated with this power generation option:
reactor accidents, radioactive waste, and nuclear proliferation.
More reactors in operation worldwide enhance in








































Fig. 3 WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of renewables
(wind plus solar, in gigawatts per year) under BAU, 450 and 550 ppm
scenarios, and realized since 1995. The “single-year” point shows the
historic maximum realized









































Fig. 2 WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of coal-based
power plus CCS (in gigawatts per year) under BAU, 450 and 550 ppm
scenarios, as well as realized without CCS during 1985–2005. The
“single-year” point shows the historic maximum realized
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incident or accident occurs, especially when considering that
an important share of the additions of nuclear capacity will
probably take place in countries with still limited reactor
operation experience and yet to be perfected safety standards.
It has been pointed out, however, that while the chance for
accidents remains unequal to zero, the likelihood for such
events has reduced significantly over the past decades and
should engender less concern today than it did in the 1980s
[15]. Also, both through more advanced reactor designs and
improved operation standards, risks for serious accidents are
likely to continue to decrease in the future.
While radioactive waste production occurs at basically
every stage of the nuclear fuel cycle, in solid, liquid, or
gaseous state, spent fuel is most problematic, since it
generates heat during many years after de-loading from the
reactor core and remains highly radioactive for thousands
of years. Radioactive contamination of the environment
from spent fuel storage can be minimized through several
layers of physical containment, probably at some stage
including reversible geological deposition deep under-
ground. While progress on deep geological disposal has
been made in, e.g., Finland, France, and Sweden, many
governments delay decisions on this subject and instead
adopt strategies of intermediate aboveground bunker or dry
cask storage like in the Netherlands and the USA. The main
issue concerning underground storage remains uncertainty
about the integrity of spent fuel canisters: It is questioned
whether the isolation offered by geological formations will
be sufficient over a period of thousands of years. The fear is
that canisters, as a result of corrosion, will leak and
consequently contaminate groundwater in the far future.
Several channels exist through which this problem could be
mitigated, in particular by organizing the disposal of waste
regionally through Internationally Monitored Waste Repos-
itories. As long as international solutions for the storage of
waste continue to be delayed, however, or other solutions
are not brought forward to tackle the intrinsic waste
problematic of nuclear energy, its role in future power
supply remains significantly handicapped. A possible
expansion of nuclear energy worldwide would continue to
give substantial reason for concern [18, 19].
Nuclear power generation inherently involves the risk
that nuclear industry-related technologies and materials are
diverted for non-civil purposes. Among nuclear energy’s
main proliferation threats are the use of uranium enrichment
facilities and the production of fissile materials like
plutonium (see notably [11]). Countries operating enrich-
ment technology or organized terrorist groups possessing
highly enriched uranium (HEU) may relatively easily
construct a basic fission explosive device and use it for
military or terrorist purposes. Several plutonium isotopes
contained in reactor-grade spent fuel, accounting for 1–2%
of its volume, are fissile and can serve to fabricate a nuclear
weapon. Especially when spent fuel from the civil nuclear
industry is reprocessed, this problem becomes apparent:
Plutonium contained in spent fuel is reasonably safe against
diversion for weapons use because of the highly radioactive
waste materials in which it is embedded, but its separation
during reprocessing makes it vulnerable for direct military or
terrorist use, even while it is of lower quality than weapon-
grade plutonium. The global control of sensitive technologies,
the monitoring of nuclear activities and safeguarding, and the
deletion of fissile materials, like HEU and plutonium, are
central to any solution of the nuclear proliferation problem. In
order to avoid fissile materials being diverted for non-civil
purposes, dedicated technical efforts and effective interna-
tional institutions are required. Their improvement is impor-
tant irrespective of the future share of nuclear energy in total
power production but will become more poignant when
nuclear energy experiences a renaissance.
Suppose that for the reasons just given one finds an
expansion of nuclear energy unacceptable, especially with
annual additions over the coming 50 years that may run in
the 15–20 GW/year, under a 550-ppm climate control
scenario and that may increase to 35 GW/year in the 450-
ppm scenario. What then would be the improvements that
need to materialize for other non-carbon options in order to
let them dominate or scale down the spread of nuclear
power in the solution set of WITCH, that is, without the
imposition of ex-ante growth constraints? In other words,
can one crowd out nuclear power off the market by
rendering other carbon-free electricity generation options
economically more attractive and thereby more competi-
tive? What sort of improvements need to be accomplished
in order to avoid the widespread expansion of nuclear
energy that many reject for the above listed set of
“classical” arguments?
We address these questions by focusing on the combus-
tion of coal for power production complemented with CCS,
since we believe it is becoming one of the most direct
competitors of nuclear power (much like nuclear energy
and oil-based power were main competitors in the 1970s
and 1980s until the last was essentially phased out as a
result of broad deployment of the former; see [16]). Indeed,
coal-based power generation plus CCS and nuclear energy
are both base-load electricity production options. We focus
on three potential areas of improvement for CCS technol-
ogy by distinguishing three cases of assumptions:
& CCS+:
the CO2 emission capture rate is raised from 90% to
99%, making CCS an essentially zero-emission
technology5.
5 This could be achieved either by improving CO2 capture technology
or by co-firing coal with biomass.
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& CCS++:
In addition, transport and storage costs do not exceed
$12/tCO2, i.e., the availability of suitable repositories is
very large.
& CCS+++:
In addition, CCS investment costs gradually decrease
until a 50% reduction over the course of 20 years.
We abstain from associating probabilities to the achiev-
ability of these three CCS scenarios (but guess that the
CCS+++ case may be very hard to materialize). Figure 4
revises Fig. 1 for the simulated nuclear energy expansion for
these three CCS-favorable cases under the 450-ppm scenar-
io. We see that each of these three cases generates a reduced
reliance on nuclear power for climate control purposes. It
can also be observed, however, that even in the most
optimistic case for CCS technology, nuclear energy will still
be needed at annual additions of about 20 GW/year. This
level thus constitutes a sort of bottom-line requirement for
nuclear power.
Figure 5 shows our results for the 550-ppm scenario
under the same three cases of progress in the development
of CCS technology. Like for the 450-ppm scenario, a
reduced reliance on nuclear power for climate management
materializes, with the same ranking between the three cases.
Overall, however, the differences between the three cases
are less pronounced, the explanation for which is the less
ambitious climate control target. Under this scenario even
in the most optimistic case for the amelioration of CCS,
nuclear energy will still be needed at a minimum threshold
level of annual additions of approximately 15 GW/year. In
both Figs. 4 and 5, the evolution of nuclear energy over the
coming half-century never drops below the BAU reference
curve as shown in Fig. 1.
What do these results imply for the amounts of
electricity generated by nuclear energy and coal-based
power equipped with CCS, via existing capacity plus the
installed additions depicted in the previous figures? Figure 6
summarizes, for the 450- and 550-ppm scenarios, respec-
tively, the global electricity produced in 2050 for these two
power production alternatives. It also shows how these total
levels of electricity production change if the three cases of
technological advancement are achieved for CCS.
Nuclear power contributes sizably more than coal plus
CCS, by about 40%, only under the 450-ppm scenario and
when none of the potential CCS improvements is attained,
as shown by the histogram in the left plot of Fig. 6. Under
optimistic assumptions for CCS technology innovation,
either in the 450- or 550-ppm scenario, coal combustion
plus CCS becomes significantly more important for power
production than nuclear energy, by a factor of about two in
the ideal case that all CCS improvements are realized. If
only the capture rate for CCS can be improved, the level of
electricity generated by these two options almost equalizes.
Note that the total electricity generated by nuclear energy
and coal plus CCS together increases with the assumed
advancements of CCS, that is, nuclear energy is crowded
out less than the increase in the use of coal plus CCS as a
result of the latter’s improvements.
5 Discussion and Conclusions
Under a stringent climate control target in an otherwise
unconstrained world for economic growth, EEE models
tend to be favorable for a widespread deployment of
nuclear energy in the power sector. Usually, analysts either
consider a large expansion of nuclear power unrealistic or
for other reasons prefer to avoid their scenario runs to yield
an outcome concentrating considerably on nuclear energy.
Consequently, specific technology diffusion constraints are
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Historical CCS ++
reference CCS +++
Fig. 5 WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of nuclear
energy (gigawatts per year) in the 550-ppm scenario with various
improvements for CCS technology



































single year CCS +
Historical CCS ++
reference CCS +++
Fig. 4 WITCH simulations of future capacity additions of nuclear
energy (gigawatts per year) in the 450-ppm scenario with various
improvements for CCS technology
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introduced to limit the expansion of nuclear power. Such
boundary conditions, however, tend to have a significant
impact on the economic performance of climate policy.
The increasing necessity to achieve globally signifi-
cant CO2 emission reductions, imminently and affordably,
is beneficial for the prospects of nuclear energy. Whether
one favors an expansion of nuclear power or not, this
energy supply option emits essentially no CO2, or at least
very low levels even when considering the entire nuclear
fuel cycle. The analysis presented in this paper shows that
if in the EEE model WITCH and probably in other
numerical models designed for the integrated assessment
of the economics of climate change, no growth constraints
are imposed on the deployability of nuclear energy, this
technology could well experience the renaissance that is
predicted by some analysts. We demonstrate that nuclear
power can at most be part of the solution to global climate
change and does not constitute a silver bullet. Hence, if at
all, it needs to be employed in conjunction with (probably
many) other CO2 mitigation options (as also described in
[18]). Nuclear energy could become a significant neces-
sary part of the total solution, if agreed climate targets are
as stringent as 450–550 ppm CO2 stabilization levels. In
particular, we show that under these climate-constrained
scenarios, the expansion rate of nuclear energy during the
forthcoming 50 years does probably not need to largely
exceed the growth rates as experienced during the heydays
of nuclear energy deployment in the early 1980s.
The analysis we performed cannot address the question
whether the nuclear industry will be able to handle the
capacity additions and corresponding capital requirements
implied by our modeling runs. Our research does indicate,
though, that the total investments necessary for a large-
scale expansion of nuclear energy are feasible from an
aggregate perspective of economic production and growth.
According to Bosetti et al. [2], also on the basis of scenario
analysis with WITCH, the challenges associated with
global climate change suggest an imminent return to the
energy R&D levels of the 1980s. In this paper, we
expand on their conclusions by reporting that also in
terms of annual nuclear electricity capacity additions we
may need to return to those that prevailed a couple of
decades ago. Of course, the predominant energy concern
of the 1970s was mostly energy insecurity, while that
preoccupying scientists and policy makers today is also
climate change. We find that the possible response to
these two different crises (oil versus climate) may be
similar, at least in certain respects.
While the nuclear expansion rates calculated in this
study could resolve significant part of the global climate
change challenge and would possess benefits in other
domains such as reducing air pollution and diminishing
energy dependence in many countries, from several
perspectives an increase in the use of nuclear energy as
simulated by WITCH would be of serious concern, notably
in terms of radioactive waste and nuclear proliferation. We
demonstrate that the technological and economic improve-
ment of CCS required to significantly scale down the
expansion needs of nuclear energy is certainly not
negligible. Yet a better CO2 capture rate, as well as reduced
CO2 storage and CCS investment costs, would allow CCS
to overtake nuclear energy as leading cost-efficient mitiga-
tion technology in the base-load power sector.
The improvements needed for CCS arguably necessitate
dedicated investments in innovation, R&D, and pilot and
demonstration programs, which would require the mobili-










































Fig. 6 WITCH simulations of electricity generation (petawatt-hours) in 2050 by coal plus CCS and nuclear power under the 450-ppm (left) and 550-
ppm (right) scenarios
Table 2 NPV of cost savings with respect to the CCS reference case
(trillion US dollars)
CCS+ CCS++ CCS+++
550 ppm 0.19 1.38 2.23
450 ppm 2.77 4.23 5.12
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tion is difficult, but the economic benefits resulting from
such improvements can provide a reference threshold,
below which it would be profitable to endorse them. Table 2
shows the cost savings resulting from CCS improvements,
calculated in terms of the net present value of global
welfare over the current century, at a 5% discount rate,
expressed as difference with respect to the CCS reference
case. Our simulations indicate that improvements in all
three CCS areas identified in this paper can lead to
substantial savings, with a maximum of over US $5 trillion
for the most stringent climate policy and more than US $2
trillion for the less ambitious one. Indeed, the benefits of
CCS improvements also depend on the climate objective.
For the 450-ppm case, increasing the capture rate proves to
provide the highest overall cost reduction leverage. For the
550-ppm scenario, on the other hand, lowering storage
costs and capital investments proves instead the most
valuable strategy.
Even when one assumes that CCS can be significantly
improved, nuclear power would still need to be expanded
sizably, typically by some 15-GW/year added capacity, in
order to reach stringent climate goals. These additions
alone would justify higher investments that allow
improving nuclear technology and empowering institu-
tions in charge of controlling its safe and secure
international deployment. Still, progress in CCS technol-
ogy could reduce the expansion needs for nuclear energy
and thus the extent of the classical problems encountered
with nuclear power. According to our cost minimization
framework, a nuclear power renaissance of some sort
may be unavoidable, so concerns surrounding several
aspects of nuclear energy ought to be solved in any case.
We think these concerns have to be adequately and
acceptably addressed even if nuclear power were to be
phased out altogether, given that radioactive and fissile
materials have been produced abundantly since the
advent of the nuclear era.
Surely the last word has not been said about nuclear
energy, nor about climate change. In this paper, we bring
forward findings at the cross section of these two
subjects. Topics abound for further work. One question
to be addressed is what the extra costs incurred would be
if one imposes a growth constraint on nuclear energy, in
line with what so far has been common practice but that
we personally have reasoned objections against. This
case would need to be compared with the scenario in
which no such constraint is applied. It is also interesting
to see what the effects would be in our modeling setting
of the recent commodity price surge for the investment
cost requirements for CCS facilities and nuclear power
plant construction. These and related issues we plan to
assess in the future.
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